Exposure to Government Campaigns and Street Traders’ Attitude Towards Street Trading in Edo

Abstract

This study investigated how street traders respond to government communication campaign messages against street trading, focusing on their exposure to the campaigns and their attitudes towards street trading regulation. A mixed-methods design was used, guided by the Elaboration Likelihood Model, Yale persuasion theory, and the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Questionnaires were administered to 341 traders in nine markets (327 valid), and 20 key informants, including market union leaders and government officials, were interviewed. Most traders (78.3%) were aware of the campaigns, and face-to-face contact was the main channel (62.7%). However, exposure was not significantly associated with attitude, χ²(1, \*N \*= 327) = 2.04, \*p \*= .153. Interviewees reported that compliance lasted only while enforcement officers were visible. Traders viewed the campaigns as punitive and cited unaffordable market stalls, distrust of government officials, and unclear instructions as obstacles. The most preferred strategy was collaboration with market leaders (40.7%). The study suggests that information alone is not enough to change attitudes. It recommends delivering messages face to face through trusted market leaders, explaining rules and risks clearly, addressing the cost of compliance, and holding regular dialogue with traders alongside enforcement.