



Digital Polarisation: YouTube's Role in Reinforcing Ethno-religious Divides in Nigeria's 2023 Presidential Election

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Abstract

The rise of digital platforms, particularly YouTube, has significantly transformed political discourse. This study examined how frequently ethnoreligious divisions appeared in YouTube political campaign videos during Nigeria's 2023 presidential election and identified the more prevalent type of digital polarisation (ethnic or religious) during the election. The study employed content analysis and simple random sampling, analysing a sample of 197 videos (determined using Raosoft's online sample calculator) from a total population of 402. The videos served as the unit of analysis, with content categorised based on the presence or absence of ethnoreligious divisions, as well as the type of division (ethnic or religious). The findings reveal that most YouTube political campaign videos during Nigeria's 2023 presidential election promoted polarisation, with religious divisions being more prevalent than ethnic ones. The results underscore the influential role of digital media particularly YouTube in reflecting and potentially amplifying socio-political divides, with religion emerging as a dominant axis of political communication in the 2023 presidential election cycle. To counter the harmful effects of identity-based polarisation on Nigeria's democracy, the study recommends urgent measures such as digital literacy programmes, stronger platform accountability, and inclusive political communication strategies. By addressing these issues, policymakers and stakeholders can harness digital media to foster unity rather than deepen societal divisions.

Keywords: Digital polarisation, YouTube political campaigns, ethnoreligious divisions, Nigerian presidential election

Introduction

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with an estimated population of 227.9 million people (World Bank, 2025; Statista, 2025). It is deeply divided along ethnic, religious, and regional lines, which have influenced its politics and national unity (Suberu, 2001). The major ethnic groups are Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba, while Islam and Christianity are the dominant religions (Pew Research Center, 2022). The country is divided into six geopolitical zones: North-West, North-East, North-Central, South-West, South-East, and South-South (Salisu, Ibrahim, Sulaiman, Ibrahim & Usaini, 2024). People from different regions sometimes live peacefully together, with interethnic marriages and shared celebrations demonstrating signs of unity (Mahmud, 2023; Yakubu, 2015). However, politics in Nigeria has changed. Since the Second Republic, politicians have exploited ethnic and religious identities to gain support (Ojeme, 2021; Okibe, 2022; Ibrahim, 2023). This practice becomes more common during elections when political tension is high (Mahmud, 2023; Madubuegwu &

Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2023). These divisions continue to shape how citizens vote and engage in politics (Oboh, 2017). According to the World Economic Forum (2023), rising societal division is one of the top long-term global risks. In Nigeria, this was evident during the 2011, 2015, and 2019 elections, where ethnicity and religion strongly influenced voter choices (Madubuegwu & Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2023). This kind of political division is known as polarisation and is a growing global concern.

Polarisation is no longer limited to communities or physical spaces. It is also increasing online, often referred to as digital polarisation the widening societal divide, often along political or ideological lines, driven by social media and online platforms (Altanlar, Aktuğlu Aktan & Eren, 2024). This occurs when opposing groups become trapped in conflicting views, making civil discussion and cooperation difficult (Emily & Christian, 2021; Leyve, 2025). The internet and social media have enabled more people to engage in politics and share ideas (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2013). However, these platforms also spread false information, hate speech, and extreme content (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). Platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, and YouTube are often used to promote political messages and harmful stereotypes (Munger & Phillips, 2022; Imran, 2016). They can also create “echo chambers”, where users are exposed only to similar views (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Heaney, Masket, Miller & Strolovitch, 2012). Nevertheless, in some cases, social media can reduce polarisation (Beam, Hutchens & Hmielowski, 2018; Yarchi, Baden & Kligler-Vilenchik, 2020).

Unlike traditional media, which follows editorial rules, social media is open and largely unregulated. This allows users to create and share content freely (Burgess & Green, 2018). While this openness supports diverse views, it also spreads ethnoreligious prejudices, conspiracy theories, and extreme opinions (Munger & Phillips, 2022). The lack of regulation allows harmful content to spread rapidly, making it more difficult to control misinformation and hate speech (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017; Nanjundaswamy, Debashis & Satish, 2023). For instance, YouTube has become a key platform for political engagement and identity expression, particularly among young Nigerians.

Over 33 million Nigerians use YouTube each month (Statista, 2023). It has become a space for campaign messages, debates, vlogs, livestreams, and commentary. Because YouTube allows all types of voices mainstream and fringe it provides both opportunities for political education and risks of spreading harmful stereotypes (Tufekci, 2018; Ojebuyi & Salawu, 2020). During the 2023 presidential election, YouTube played a major role in political discussions (Salisu et al., 2024). The election featured Bola Ahmed Tinubu (Muslim, Yoruba), Atiku Abubakar (Muslim, Fulani), and Peter Obi (Christian, Igbo). These candidates reflect Nigeria’s ethnic and religious diversity. Thus, the election likely demonstrates how identity influences political debate on digital platforms such as YouTube. Although social media is increasingly important in Nigerian politics, little research has examined YouTube’s role in shaping ethnic and religious divisions (Ojebuyi & Salawu, 2020). This study fills that gap by exploring how YouTube content during the 2023 election reflected ethnoreligious polarisation in Nigeria.

Statement of the Problem

Nigeria’s constitutional commitment to national integration has not translated into sustained democratic stability, as deep-seated ethnoreligious divisions continue to shape the political landscape, particularly during elections (Olabisi, 2021). These divisions have been further intensified by the emergence of digital platforms, especially YouTube (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). Although YouTube promotes political engagement and civic participation, its algorithm-driven structure and

limited moderation contribute to the widespread circulation of polarising content (Higazi, 2016; Mustapha & Ehrhardt, 2018; Madubuegwu & Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2023).

During the 2023 presidential election featuring candidates from diverse ethnoreligious backgrounds YouTube played a central role in shaping political discourse. Earlier studies suggest that, rather than fostering inclusive dialogue, the platform was frequently used to propagate divisive, identity-based content (Robert, 2016; Burgess & Green, 2018). This raises critical concerns about YouTube's influence in reinforcing identity politics, echo chambers, and national disunity. Despite the platform's growing influence, particularly among Nigerian youth, scholarly analysis of YouTube's role in ethnoreligious polarisation during presidential elections remains sparse. This study, therefore, seeks to examine how YouTube content during the 2023 presidential election contributed to the reinforcement of ethnoreligious divisions in Nigeria.

Objectives of the Study

The study aims to achieve the following:

1. To investigate the presence or absence of ethnoreligious divisions disseminated on YouTube during the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria.
2. To determine the frequent type of digital polarisation (whether ethnic or religious) during the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria.

Review of Concepts

Digital Polarisation

Digital polarisation refers to the growing societal divide fuelled by online platforms and social media (Paul, 2020). This phenomenon extends beyond physical communities and now manifests in digital spaces as well (Emily & Christian, 2021). It occurs when opposing groups become entrenched in conflicting viewpoints, thereby hindering civil discourse and cooperation (Leyve, 2025). While the internet and social media have expanded opportunities for political engagement and the exchange of ideas, they have also contributed to the deepening of ideological divides (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2013).

YouTube

According to Alina (2018), YouTube is a widely accessible and free online video-sharing platform that allows users across the globe to create, upload, and view video content. It serves as a digital space where individuals can express creativity, share knowledge, entertain audiences, and engage with a global community. In addition to content creation, YouTube promotes active user interaction through features such as subscribing to channels, liking or disliking videos, commenting, and participating in live chats during streams. The number of YouTube users in Nigeria is projected to reach approximately 11.99 million by 2025 (Statista, 2023).

Religion

According to Aladegebola (as cited in Layefa & Olusola, 2014), religion is rooted in belief systems that transcend rational explanation, offering metaphysical insights into existence and human behaviour. Yesufu (2018) further defines religion as the service and worship of God or gods, emphasising its ritualistic and devotional dimensions. Through practices such as prayer, sacrifice, and adherence to sacred traditions, individuals express reverence and seek spiritual connection. Collectively, these perspectives underscore religion as a complex cultural system that shapes identity, values, and social norms, while reflecting the human relationship with a perceived transcendent reality.

Ethno-Religious Identity

Ethnicity refers to a shared cultural heritage characterised by common language, customs, religious practices, and social norms, all of which foster a strong sense of group identity and belonging (Smith, 2024). This identity goes beyond physical attributes or geographical origins to encompass collective experiences and symbolic elements. Thompson (2016) similarly defines an ethnic group as a community bound by perceived common ancestry, cultural traditions, and historical narratives, maintaining its distinctiveness through socially reinforced boundaries. When religious affiliation becomes closely tied to ethnic identity as is often the case in countries like Nigeria the concept of ethno-religious identity emerges. This compound identity merges ethnicity and religion into a powerful social force, shaping political attitudes, alliances, and perceptions of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. In such contexts, individuals often experience loyalty to both their ethnic and religious groups simultaneously, which can deepen societal divisions and fuel polarisation, particularly during elections or political conflicts.

Review of Empirical Studies

In a study by Imran (2016), the researcher examined the presence and characteristics of Islamophobic hate speech on Facebook, particularly in light of rising online abuse targeting Muslim communities. Employing content analysis, Imran analysed 100 Facebook pages, posts, and comment threads, identifying 494 instances of anti-Muslim hate speech. The analysis led to the development of a typology comprising five key characteristics of anti-Muslim rhetoric on the platform. The findings revealed that Muslim communities were consistently demonised and vilified through negative stereotypes, discriminatory language, and harassment content capable of inciting violence and undermining social cohesion.

Also addressing identity and political dynamics, Osmond and Anaukwu (2024) examined the impact of ethnic politics on Nigeria’s democratisation process, focusing on the 2023 general and gubernatorial elections in Lagos State, an ethnically diverse and politically significant region. The study sought to understand how ethnic identity influences electoral behaviour and democratic consolidation. Employing an ex post facto research design, and grounded in Social Identity Theory and Rational Choice Theory, the researchers used documentary analysis to explore the role of ethnicity in political mobilisation and election outcomes. The findings showed that while ethnic identity was instrumental in mobilising voters and contributed to electoral violence and intimidation, it did not significantly alter the final electoral results.

Building on this theme, Madubuegwu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2023) investigated how ethno-religious identity influenced voting behaviour in Nigeria’s 2011, 2015, and 2019 presidential elections. The study used an exploratory research design, collecting data through documentary analysis and Key Informant Interviews with 36 participants across Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones. Data from interviews, phone calls, and focus groups were analysed using content analysis. The findings indicated that ethno-religious identity strongly shaped voter choices, largely influenced by candidates’ identity affiliations. The authors recommended enhanced civic engagement and institutional reforms to strengthen Nigeria’s electoral democracy.

Turning to the American context, Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) sought to test Fiorina’s claim that ideological polarisation among the U.S. public is a myth. Using data from the American National Election Studies and national exit polls, the study identified a significant rise in ideological polarisation since the 1970s. It revealed deep divides between Democrats and Republicans, red and blue state voters, and religious versus secular groups—particularly among politically engaged

citizens. Interestingly, the findings indicated that, rather than discouraging participation, polarisation increased political interest and voter turnout.

In a study of political activism, Heaney et al. (2012) explored partisan polarisation at the level of individual party activists, an area less examined than institutional behaviours like lobbying. Drawing on survey data from 738 delegates at the 2008 Democratic and Republican national conventions, the researchers used network regression analysis to examine organisational co-membership patterns. Results showed highly polarised networks, with only 1.78% of co-memberships and 2.74% of inter-organisational links crossing party lines. These findings persistent even after controlling for ideology and demographics suggest that partisan segregation among activists hampers cross-party cooperation.

In a related Nigerian study, Salisu et al. (2024) investigated the impact of religion and ethnicity on voting behaviour, particularly in the 2023 elections. Using content analysis, the researchers reviewed literature including books, journals, and articles to link past findings with current electoral outcomes. The results revealed that both religion and ethnicity significantly shaped voter preferences, often aligning with candidates' religious or ethnic identities.

In the United States, Prior (2013) explored whether the rise of partisan media contributed to increasing political polarisation and support for ideologically extreme candidates. Drawing on content analysis and observational data, prior found that while most Americans remained ideologically moderate, politically engaged individuals showed signs of polarisation. However, the causal link between partisan media and attitudinal shifts remained inconclusive.

Contrary to concerns about digital polarisation, Beam et al. (2018) studied Facebook news consumption during the 2016 U.S. presidential election to assess whether filter bubbles and echo chambers exacerbated polarisation. Using a three-wave national panel survey guided by selective exposure and reinforcing spirals models, the researchers tracked exposure to pro- and counter-attitudinal content. The findings showed a modest spiral of depolarisation, with increased exposure to opposing views reducing partisan hostility. The study found no evidence that Facebook intensified affective polarisation.

Finally, Yarchi, Baden, and Kligler-Vilenchik (2020) examined how political polarisation varies across social media platforms. Using computational communication science methods, they analysed approximately 250,000 online interactions over 16 months surrounding a political controversy in Israel. The study measured three dimensions of polarisation: interactional, positional, and affective, and revealed significant platform-specific differences. Twitter exhibited high polarisation, WhatsApp showed a trend towards depolarisation, and Facebook emerged as the least homophilic. These findings underscore the need for context-sensitive, platform-specific approaches to studying political polarisation online.

The literature above reveals several key gaps: insufficient comparative research on how identity politics and polarisation differ across Western and African democracies; limited integration of online and offline political behaviour analyses; and a lack of focus on how polarisation affects less politically active or non-elite groups in diverse developing contexts. In addition, existing studies often lack holistic, multi-dimensional frameworks that examine the interplay of identity and media exposure. There is also a shortage of longitudinal, data-driven research tracking the evolution of polarisation in emerging democracies. It is on this basis that this study seeks to examine how YouTube content during the 2023 presidential election contributed to the reinforcement of ethnoreligious divisions in Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

This study is grounded in Social Identity Theory (SIT), developed by social psychologists Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner in 1979. The theory explains how individuals derive their identity from group affiliations such as ethnicity, religion, or political alignment (Harwood, 2020). SIT proposes that social categorisation, social identification, and social comparison influence how individuals perceive others, often through in-group and out-group dynamics (Tukachinsky, Mastro, & Yarchi, 2015). This theoretical perspective is particularly relevant to the current study. These objectives of the study align closely with the core tenets of SIT, which suggest that individuals do not interpret information neutrally, but rather through the lens of group identification. In election contexts especially within a diverse country like Nigeria political discourse and digital content often reinforce group distinctions, thereby intensifying in-group loyalty and out-group hostility.

Social Identity Theory, therefore, offers a valuable interpretive framework for assessing how YouTube videos may perpetuate and normalise ethnoreligious biases by appealing to shared identities and intergroup rivalry. It is precisely this mechanism where media acts as a conduit for reinforcing societal divisions that SIT helps to unravel, making it a fitting theoretical lens for this research.

Methodology

This study employed content analysis, a research method used to examine media such as text, audio, video, and images in order to identify patterns, themes, and meanings (Wimmer & Dominick, 2014). The period under review spanned from 1 April 2022 to 25 February 2023, covering the timeframe from the commencement of party primaries to Election Day in Nigeria. Data (videos only) were collected from YouTube using the Instant Data Scraper tool. Keywords such as “2023 presidential/primary election in Nigeria” and “APC/LP/PDP 2023 election” were used during the search process within the study period. A total of 402 YouTube political campaign videos were collected. Using Raosoft, an online sample size calculator, a sample size of 197 was determined with a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error. From the total population of 402, simple random sampling was used to select the 197 videos for analysis. The unit of analysis in this study is YouTube political campaign videos. The content categories examined were:

- Presence of ethnoreligious division
- Absence of ethnoreligious division
- Ethnic polarisation
- Religious polarisation

Table: Categorisation of Ethno-Religious Content and Possible Flashpoints

Categorisation	Description	Possible Flashpoint
Presence	Comment that clearly reflects or promotes ethnoreligious division	• Ethnic bias (e.g., against Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba) • Religious antagonism (e.g., Christian vs. Muslim) • Hate speech or incitement
Absence	Comment is neutral or does not engage with ethnoreligious issues	• Focus on policy/issues • General support/opinion without division • Humorous, off-topic, or unrelated content
Religion	Comment that clearly reflects or promotes religious division	• Islam, Christianity, church, mosque, etc.
Ethnic	Comment that clearly reflects or promotes ethnic division	• Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, etc.

Source: Field work (2025)

The services of three coders were employed, and each was trained for the task. Data were collected using a coding sheet, which was used to record the frequency of the categories observed across the 197 videos. The content validity of the coding sheet was confirmed by experts in political communication and language. Inter-coder reliability was tested using Cronbach's Alpha, which yielded a reliability score of 0.73. Finally, the data (categories and themes) were tallied, presented in tables, and analysed using frequency and percentage.

Data Presentation

The research team methodically evaluated a total of 197 political campaign YouTube videos through rigorous viewing and audio assessment. From this careful evaluation, a total of 591 narratives were identified across the viewed videos. The following key findings emerged:

Table 1: Frequency of Ethnoreligious Divides in YouTube Political Campaign Narratives During the 2023 Presidential Election in Nigeria

Categorisation	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Present	333	56.3
Absent	258	43.7
Total	591	100.0

Source: Fieldwork (2025)

Table 1 presents data on the perceived presence or absence of ethnoreligious divides during the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. The table shows that 56.3% of the political campaign videos on YouTube exhibited ethnoreligious content. In contrast, 43.7% (258 videos) indicated that such divisions were absent. This suggests that more than half of the analysed videos during the 2023 presidential election were influenced or marked by ethnoreligious factors. The data points to a significant level of identity-based political tension, highlighting the continued role of ethnicity and religion in shaping political behaviour and electoral dynamics in Nigeria.

Table 2: Distribution of Ethnic and Religious Divides During the 2023 Presidential Election in Nigeria

Categorisation	Frequency	Percentage
Ethnic	124	37.2%
Religious	209	62.8%
Total	333	100%

Source: Fieldwork (2025)

Table 2 presents the categorisation focus of political campaign YouTube videos that reflected an ethnoreligious divide during the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. Out of the 333 videos identified as containing ethnoreligious content, 209 videos (62.8%) were centred around religion, while 124 videos (37.2%) emphasised ethnicity. This suggests that religion was a more prominent factor than ethnicity in the content and messaging of political campaign videos during the election. The prevalence of religious references indicates that campaign narratives often leveraged religious identity to appeal to specific audiences, potentially reinforcing sectarian sentiments and shaping voter perceptions. While ethnic identity remained a significant theme, it was less emphasised compared to religious messaging.

Discussion of Findings

The study found that over half (56%) of the YouTube content during the 2023 Nigerian presidential election focused on ethnic and religious divisions. This suggests that many of the videos were created to appeal to people's sense of belonging to specific groups. According to Social Identity Theory, people see themselves in terms of their group membership such as their ethnic or religious identity which can lead to favouritism towards their group and negative views of others (Tajfel &

Turner, 1979). This aligns with the findings of Salisu et al. (2024), who also discovered that ethnicity and religion strongly influence how Nigerians vote. Similarly, Madubuegwu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2023) noted that voters in past elections often chose candidates based on religious or ethnic identity. Ibrahim (2023) highlighted that politicians frequently exploit these identities to gain support, which Social Identity Theory interprets as the strategic use of group identity in political mobilisation. Imran (2016) and Ribeiro, Ottoni, West, Almeida, and Meira (2020) add that digital platforms facilitate the rapid spread of divisive content. However, there are other possible explanations for these patterns. For instance, poverty and low levels of education may also influence political engagement, though these factors are not always visible in online content (Olokor, 2022; Hoffmann & Patel, 2022; Oluwaseun & Sunday, 2023). Additionally, while Social Identity Theory effectively explains group behaviour, it may not account for instances where individuals choose to act outside their group affiliations. The Muslim-Muslim presidential ticket in 2023, for example, may reflect both ethnic division and an attempt to challenge traditional identity-based politics.

The data also showed that religious divisions (62.8%) appeared more frequently than ethnic ones (37.2%) in the videos. This indicates that religion played a larger role in shaping political messaging. Previous studies have similarly found that religion strongly affects voting behaviour in Nigeria (Osaghae & Suberu, 2019; Kabir, Rilwan, & Khamis, 2024). Although Nigeria is constitutionally a secular state, religion remains deeply intertwined with politics (Yesufu, 2016). Social Identity Theory helps to explain how religious group membership can foster favouritism and tension, particularly between Muslims and Christians. Nonetheless, alternative interpretations should also be considered. Politicians may deploy religion mainly as a strategic tool to attract votes, rather than as a reflection of voters' genuine beliefs. Some scholars argue that economic hardship, intolerance, and weak governance may have a greater influence on voting behaviour than religion per se, with religion merely serving as a campaign device (Olokor, 2022; Hoffmann & Patel, 2022; Oluwaseun & Sunday, 2023; Syeda & Ahmed, 2014). Therefore, while Social Identity Theory provides a useful framework for understanding how ethnic and religious identities influence political messaging online, it is essential to consider additional factors such as poverty, political strategy, and the role of technology. Together, these elements contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how polarisation unfolds in Nigeria, both in digital spaces and in everyday life.

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that ethnoreligious divisions were a prominent feature of YouTube content during the 2023 Nigerian presidential election, with religious stereotypes appearing more frequently than ethnic ones. The findings underscore how digital media platforms particularly YouTube act as powerful tools for reinforcing group-based identities and intensifying political polarisation. The application of Social Identity Theory offered insight into how individuals' affiliations with religious or ethnic groups shape their political perceptions and behaviours, especially during electoral contests. However, other studies have argued that identity-based polarisation is not driven solely by group psychology. Structural factors such as poverty, education, and political manipulation also interact with identity to deepen societal divisions.

Recommendation

This study suggests the following recommendations:

1. Government agencies, civil society organizations, and educators should promote digital media literacy, especially among youth and rural populations. This will help citizens critically evaluate online content and resist manipulative or divisive messaging rooted in ethnic or religious stereotypes.

2. Policymakers (such as BON etcetera) and digital platform providers- YouTube should collaborate to develop transparent content moderation guidelines that limit the spread of hate speech and politically polarizing content without infringing on free speech. Algorithms should be audited to reduce bias toward sensational or divisive content.
3. Political actors and parties should be encouraged through incentives or public accountability measures to use inclusive rhetoric that emphasizes shared national identity over ethnic or religious affiliations during campaigns.

Limitations of the Study and suggestions for further studies

A major limitation of this study lies in its exclusive reliance on the quantitative analysis of ethno-religious content in YouTube political campaign videos from the 2023 Nigerian presidential election. This approach may not fully capture the depth and complexity of audience exposure to digital political polarisation. The exclusion of audience reactions and comments further restricts insights into how such content is received and interpreted. Additionally, the absence of a qualitative component limits the study's ability to explore the underlying meanings and contextual nuances of digital polarisation. Future research should incorporate qualitative methods to address these limitations and provide a more comprehensive understanding.

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Appendix: samples of Youtube videos analysed



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/Eq3QGlzFOYs>



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/BLrtmIKWRys>



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNF6OtHPsiU>



https://www.youtube.com/shorts/SitSEar_oWI



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/-x9VXaO9rf4>



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/QUTsJpAnMH8>



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPcv6cMydYM>



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/O2yOluE> Us



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/KGUIJ8RIBAU>



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/K2fHqp9AnlA>



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/GeCQqdDIH6o>



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2GAh_3H_y_A



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/eEE2UFxYISc>



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/crj8FunxLMc>



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/eGcLQB5yFkQ>



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nUw5oI8dqXE>



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNF6OtHPsiU>



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j6N7VO6rcJ8>



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZWgF8tGihY>



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ki_c5M2A2TE



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OEi6J-XF6x8>



<https://www.youtube.com/shorts/zsTa-asAjg4>